The Hard Truth: Fighting Crime in a Shrinking Economy
Trinidad and Tobago is again facing a surge in violent crime that is shaking communities and exposing the limits of the current response. The drivers are well known: organised gangs, illegal firearms and the narcotics trade. These networks cannot be dismantled by stop-and-search alone, and they will not be contained without fixing chronic weaknesses in the justice system, low detection rates, crippling court backlogs and a lingering sense of impunity that erodes public trust.
Crime here also has deep social and economic roots. Emergency-style measures may suppress violence temporarily, but they cannot rebuild communities or offer young people real alternatives to gang life. Any serious strategy must combine enforcement with prevention, opportunity and functioning institutions.
That is why the debate on Zones of Special Operations (ZOSOs) matters. Targeted zones could focus resources on high-crime areas without the broad reach of a national SoE, but the regional record is mixed. Jamaica’s experience suggests one key lesson: targeted policing works best when paired with social interventions, human-rights safeguards, parliamentary oversight, sunset clauses and genuine community buy-in, treated as one tool, not a cure-all.
The Senate’s defeat of the ZOSO Bill, then, should not be framed as the State failing. It was a reaffirmation that the country wants safety, but not at the expense of democratic guardrails. The Government now needs a credible Plan B, one that strengthens detection and prosecutions, disrupts guns and gangs, and supports communities beyond short bursts of policing.
Meanwhile, old concerns about the “independence” of Independent senators have resurfaced, reflecting a long-standing national scepticism about political neutrality in a small society. At the same time, the Opposition has struggled to look like a coherent alternative. There is noise, agitation and personalities jostling for relevance, but noise is not strategy. A government is not pressured by scattered outrage; it is pressured by disciplined scrutiny, clear policy contrasts and sustained engagement with the public’s daily anxieties.
All of this is unfolding under tightening economic constraints. With declining energy production and less fiscal room, the country cannot “tick over” as before. History shows what severe downturns can bring, including high unemployment, and the energy platform that funded decades of stability, especially Point Lisas, is now constrained by reduced gas supply. Difficult choices may still avert external assistance, but only if adjustment is managed early and decisively.
In the end, Trinidad and Tobago faces a twin test: restore security without sacrificing core rights, and manage economic decline without deepening the social conditions that feed crime. The public has signalled what it will not trade away; the burden is now on leadership to deliver a balanced plan that works.
Sarge
