Chris Dehring : When “Assets” Don’t Show Up Like You Think

A recent public comment by Chris Dehring​, calling the Caribbean Premier League (CPL) one of Cricket West Indies’ (CWI) “most valuable financial assets”​, raises an accounting question critics keep coming back to: Does the CPL actually appear as an asset in the way most people mean it?

Does the CPL show as an “Asset”?

On paper, not in the straightforward way a building, equipment, or a bank balance would.

From a technical accounting and ownership standpoint, the CPL doesn’t sit on CWI’s balance sheet as a traditional capital asset. The reason is simple: CWI isn’t the straightforward owner in the legal sense.

Ownership structure (the key technical point)

Critics argue that CWI does not have full legal ownership of the CPL. Instead, the league is described as a private venture owned through Denis O’Brien’s structure​, specifically via Cricket Sporting Investments Limited (CSIL).

So if the legal title doesn’t match the “asset” story, the accounting interpretation becomes more about economic exposure and control of cash flows than ownership in the classic balance-sheet sense.

Dehring’s interpretation: ownership vs. “effective returns”

Dehring’s counter is that legal ownership is not the same thing as the effective measure of returns. In his view, calling the CPL an “asset” is about how much it benefits CWI​, particularly because it generates cash flow and value to CWI while CWI isn’t bearing the day-to-day financial risk of operating the tournament.

In plain language: Dehring is arguing from a benefits-and-returns perspective, not a legal-title perspective.

The “product” argument

He also frames the CPL as part of a “family” of CWI cricket products​, because it operates under licenses and forms part of the regional domestic calendar.

Again, that’s a business model description, not necessarily a statement about how the numbers are classified in audited financial statements.

So how does it actually show up in the financials?

This is where the argument gets practical. In CWI’s 2024 and 2025 audited financial statements, the CPL appears less like a balance-sheet asset and more like a stream that shows up through revenues connected to the league, such as sanction fees and profit-related income, rather than as a capitalized investment.

Here’s what critics point to as the “real footprint”:

1) Sanction fees (recorded as revenue-type value)

Over roughly the past 12 years, CPL is said to have paid about US$17 million in sanction fees to CWI. That kind of inflow is accounted for through income/fee lines​, not as an asset.

2) Profit sharing (income, not capital)

CWI reportedly receives a substantial share of value from the profit side, and that shows up in the financials as income​, again, not as a capital asset.

3) Cost avoidance (the benefit is structural, but not an “asset” in the usual sense)

Critics also highlight that the CPL and its franchises bear about US$25 million annually in operating costs. The argument is that CWI benefits because it avoids that financial burden.

But in accounting terms, “not paying costs” tends to show up indirectly (through margins, income, and net results) rather than as a clear asset sitting on the balance sheet.

Bottom line: What’s being called an “asset” vs. how accounting classifies it

So the dispute is basically this:

• Dehring’s framing: The CPL functions like a valuable asset because it reliably generates economic returns for CWI.
• Critics’ accounting framing: If CWI doesn’t own it like a conventional asset and the financial statements don’t list it as a capital asset, then the “asset” label may be more rhetorical than accounting-accurate.

If Dehring wants to call the CPL an “asset,” critics will ask him: in whose language​, business outcomes or audited accounting classifications?

Sarge

Hey Dehring....

You call such an asset...

Take it to any bank , lets see if you can get a line of credit

You will be shown the door very quickly.😎

Where does CWI gets its personnel...some are clueless.

@sgtdjones

you are correct however you have missed a critical point or two, Namely Dehring's ability to negotiate and the Banks awareness of the income generated by the CPL for Sammy and co (I couldn't resist that )😄

@ponderiver

😆😆

Be careful...Dehring can declare the chief selecta as an asset😁

Thanks, it's on its way, gotta go! busy day today

15 deg C and blue sky.😎

@ponderiver

You tink Dehring will respond? 😎

I am ready to rumble...😂

@sgtdjones

Dehring can declare the chief selecta as an asset

most of us have come to that conclusion and rightly so , of course we left out the et 🙄

@sgtdjones

May not, but if it's "income", shows you can service the loan, no?

@natty_forever

Pondi, Natty

I wouldn’t call Dehring a “banker” if he’s making the kinds of statements pointed out,because I’ve been dealing with Canada’s top-level bankers for over 20 years. So let me walk you through how they’d look at CWI’s financial position, like it’s a credit file on a desk.

Let’s break it down the way a banker would.

1) What kind of assets does CWI have?

A banker wants solid, real stuff—things you can sell quickly if things go wrong:

• buildings
• land
• factories
• equipment
• clear, stable operations that produce money consistently

They want “assets that sit there and keep their value,” not “assets that disappear after the match is over.”

CWI’s reality (in banker-speak):

• The biggest “asset” CWI has is its players, but here’s the catch: once the games end, players aren’t something you can sell like a building. They’re people. And if CWI owes them money, that “asset” becomes a liability.
• They do have a stadium/field in Antigua, but bankers will ask: Is it actually in high demand? Can it be sold quickly for decent money?
• And your answer is basically: No.

So from a banker’s perspective, CWI doesn’t look like a company with assets that protect a loan.

2) How steady is the income?

Bankers love consistent income, because it tells them you can pay back the loan on time.

But with CWI:

• income looks fluctuating
• some programs/tours are profitable in some years and negative in others
• the marketing side looks weak or missing, which raises questions about how income is being generated long-term

And when income is inconsistent, bankers get nervous because repayment becomes uncertain.

3) Liabilities (what CWI owes)

Then you look at what they owe, and it’s real and immediate:

• player retainers (payments that must be made)
• player touring fees
• funding/operating support that’s used to build future players,some of which is already owed
• head office and management costs
• rentals, staffing, and board expenses (meetings, travel, hotels, etc.)

So the picture becomes: CWI has obligations, but not the kind of stable assets/income that make loan repayment feel secure.

What bankers would say overall

A banker might summarize it like this:

• CWI is a private entity, yet it benefits from CARICOM/tax/stadium/funding-related advantages so they’ll ask how that structure really impacts risk.
• The leadership and governance can look closed off or questionable, like outsiders can’t easily validate decisions.
• This doesn’t look stable enough to be “risk-worthy” for lending.
• At the moment, there’s a serious cash flow problem:
• invoices and payments may need to be delayed
• player tours are allegedly behind on payments by months
• And the annual statements raise questions because the answers don’t feel complete.

The core banker mindset

Bankers don’t just ask, “Do you have income?”

They ask:

• Can you pay the loan back promptly, without stress?
• If you can’t, can you sell something valuable fast enough to cover the debt?

And if the honest answer is “we don’t really have sellable assets,” then the loan becomes riskier fast.

So to your question: “May not, but if it’s income, doesn’t that mean you can service the loan?”

Bankers would basically respond:

• “Sure, income helps, but only if it’s reliable.”
• “And income is only useful if cash flow is healthy and payments are consistent.”

So yes ,in theory income can support loan repayment.

But in practice, when cash flow is tight and obligations are due, bankers start planning how to get out early.

Bottom line:

If this were on a banker’s desk, they’d likely think:

“This isn’t stable enough. We’re not taking that risk.”

And yeah, any banker would run for the hills.

Sarge

@sgtdjones

Well he has been there done that.

@natty_forever

Well he has been there done that.

Dehring, Bunting & Golding (DB&G) was a pioneering Jamaican investment advisory firm and brokerage house, founded in 1992-1993.

Dehring, Bunting & Golding (DB&G) was primarily an investment bank and brokerage firm, rather than a traditional commercial bank. Founded in Jamaica in the early 1990s, it focused on securities trading, corporate finance, and wealth. While it wasn't a "bank" where you'd have a typical chequing account, it was a major player in Jamaica's financial sector for bond trading and government deal funding

An investment advisory firm and a brokerage house can both help you “invest,” but they’re built for different jobs,and that difference matters.

A brokerage house is mainly a trading platform. Its core function is to execute buy and sell orders. When you choose a security, the brokerage turns that choice into a transaction. And because the business model is transaction-based, compensation often comes from commissions, markups, or other trade-linked charges. Explanation: a brokerage makes money when trading happens.

An investment advisory firm is built to advise, to help you decide what to buy, how to structure a portfolio, and what to hold (and why). Advisory firms typically charge fees rather than relying primarily on commissions tied to each trade, commonly a percentage of assets under management or an advisory fee. Explanation: an advisory firm makes money from the ongoing relationship of giving guidance and managing portfolios.

Peter Bunting: Often served as the Chairman and CEO.

Mark Golding: Acted as the Company Secretary and legal mind.

Christopher Dehring: Executive Director and marketing strategist.

Sarge

@ natty

@ pondi....

Chris Dehring didn't oversee the "pitfall" two years ago because he was not the CEO then; he was appointed to the role in February 2025. The financial erosion occurred during the previous administration's cycle, which relied on a business model that masked long-term structural deficits with one-off windfalls.

Dehring was brought in specifically because the existing business plan had failed to anticipate this crash; an Emergency CEO.

Chris Dehring is leveraging his background to pivot Cricket West Indies (CWI) toward commercial partnerships and licensing models that mirror private equity structures, rather than traditional debt.

Why the Plan Falsely Looked "Solid" in 2024 .Two years ago, CWI's balance sheet was artificially buoyed by several factors that led to an overestimation of financial health.

Leadership based their financial assumptions on high broadcast rights fees that failed to materialize as global appetite for non-Big Three (India, Australia, England) cricket softened.

Delayed "Reality Check": The board had a cash reserve of US$17.5 million in 2024, which effectively "kicked the can down the road," allowing them to avoid cutting expensive but unprofitable domestic tournaments until the money was gone.

 His 2025–2026 strategy is a corrective measure, not the original plan that led to the crisis.

Auditing Faulty Assumptions: Upon taking over, Dehring’s team identified that they would lose US$26 million in 2026 simply by honoring the current ICC schedule.

Pivoting to Survival: His plan shifted from "growth" to "survival," which included the immediate scrapping of tournaments like the Under-17s to preserve enough cash for the senior international team to travel.

 The mistake made two years ago was underestimating the net loss of hosting "lesser" nations. CWI assumed these tours would be revenue-neutral, but high logistics and TV production costs across multiple Caribbean islands made them massive liabilities.

Dehring’s strategy focuses on unlocking the value of "Brand West Indies" through various channels:

Sports Tourism Infrastructure:

• The Antigua Hub: CWI has secured 20 acres in Coolidge, Antigua, for a High-Performance Centre (2026–2030).
• Third-Party Investment: This facility is designed to attract international teams for elite training, creating a new revenue stream outside of match-day ticket sales.

Monetizing "Brand West Indies":

• Tourism Sector Lobbying: Dehring is aggressively calling for Caribbean airlines and hotels,who benefit from cricket-driven travel, to move from "zero sponsorship" to a "shared investment" model.

Dehring’s goal of returning Cricket West Indies (CWI) to a net profit of approximately US$8 million by 2027 is mathematically possible but highly ambitious, as it depends on major "ifs":

Can the "US$26 Million Hole" Be Plugged?

The most immediate hurdle is surviving the 2026 fiscal year, which is projected to see a US$26 million loss.

To reach a profit by 2027, Dehring must bridge this gap using:

Loan Financing: CWI is expected to use a combination of ICC loans and commercial banking credit to maintain liquidity.

Aggressive Cuts: Significant savings are already being found by axing the Under-17 tournaments, removing the Academy and CCC teams from regional play, and merging women's competitions

Can New Revenue Streams Launch in Time?

The 2027 profit projection relies on income that doesn't fully exist yet:

Betting & Licensing: A strategic partnership with CAGE Bet Sports is expected to provide significant cash inflows starting in 2027, provided they secure the necessary regional operating licenses.

The CPL Factor: Dehring views the Caribbean Premier League (CPL) as one of CWI's most valuable financial assets. A new MOU aims to extract more "profit without risk" through licensing, especially with the addition of the Jamaica Kingsmen in 2026.

Sports Tourism Hub: The Antigua High-Performance Centre is intended to become an "investment asset class," attracting third-party teams to the region to generate year-round revenue.

Comment: Positive US$8 million by 2027 is mathematically possible but highly ambitious, as it depends on major "ifs". I wish him the best. He needs a 4 year plan , not 2 years.

Gentlemen ....I have explained his plan....

Sarge.

@sgtdjones

very well said

looks like everyone is running from this thread

it is easily the most insightful and thought provoking.thread in a long while

I concur that our biggest assets are our people (players)

the other being our location. Given the uncertainty created by the recklessness of Trump and the equally reckless Netanyahu , we are in danger of missing an opportunity to establish a war free zone with a seven month window for cricket which would swell our collective coffers

High performance centre be damned it is a job for the boys but will not produce one single cricketer of note . The investment ought to be in schools and club cricket

@sgtdjones

You think the BLs get it?

@ponderiver

The "CEO must go" cabal is glaringly missing.

@natty_forever

they are indeed dem gone a kuntry jackass farming is time consuming😂