Chris Dehring : When “Assets” Don’t Show Up Like You Think
A recent public comment by Chris Dehring, calling the Caribbean Premier League (CPL) one of Cricket West Indies’ (CWI) “most valuable financial assets”, raises an accounting question critics keep coming back to: Does the CPL actually appear as an asset in the way most people mean it?
Does the CPL show as an “Asset”?
On paper, not in the straightforward way a building, equipment, or a bank balance would.
From a technical accounting and ownership standpoint, the CPL doesn’t sit on CWI’s balance sheet as a traditional capital asset. The reason is simple: CWI isn’t the straightforward owner in the legal sense.
Ownership structure (the key technical point)
Critics argue that CWI does not have full legal ownership of the CPL. Instead, the league is described as a private venture owned through Denis O’Brien’s structure, specifically via Cricket Sporting Investments Limited (CSIL).
So if the legal title doesn’t match the “asset” story, the accounting interpretation becomes more about economic exposure and control of cash flows than ownership in the classic balance-sheet sense.
Dehring’s interpretation: ownership vs. “effective returns”
Dehring’s counter is that legal ownership is not the same thing as the effective measure of returns. In his view, calling the CPL an “asset” is about how much it benefits CWI, particularly because it generates cash flow and value to CWI while CWI isn’t bearing the day-to-day financial risk of operating the tournament.
In plain language: Dehring is arguing from a benefits-and-returns perspective, not a legal-title perspective.
The “product” argument
He also frames the CPL as part of a “family” of CWI cricket products, because it operates under licenses and forms part of the regional domestic calendar.
Again, that’s a business model description, not necessarily a statement about how the numbers are classified in audited financial statements.
So how does it actually show up in the financials?
This is where the argument gets practical. In CWI’s 2024 and 2025 audited financial statements, the CPL appears less like a balance-sheet asset and more like a stream that shows up through revenues connected to the league, such as sanction fees and profit-related income, rather than as a capitalized investment.
Here’s what critics point to as the “real footprint”:
1) Sanction fees (recorded as revenue-type value)
Over roughly the past 12 years, CPL is said to have paid about US$17 million in sanction fees to CWI. That kind of inflow is accounted for through income/fee lines, not as an asset.
2) Profit sharing (income, not capital)
CWI reportedly receives a substantial share of value from the profit side, and that shows up in the financials as income, again, not as a capital asset.
3) Cost avoidance (the benefit is structural, but not an “asset” in the usual sense)
Critics also highlight that the CPL and its franchises bear about US$25 million annually in operating costs. The argument is that CWI benefits because it avoids that financial burden.
But in accounting terms, “not paying costs” tends to show up indirectly (through margins, income, and net results) rather than as a clear asset sitting on the balance sheet.
Bottom line: What’s being called an “asset” vs. how accounting classifies it
So the dispute is basically this:
- Dehring’s framing: The CPL functions like a valuable asset because it reliably generates economic returns for CWI.
- Critics’ accounting framing: If CWI doesn’t own it like a conventional asset and the financial statements don’t list it as a capital asset, then the “asset” label may be more rhetorical than accounting-accurate.
If Dehring wants to call the CPL an “asset,” critics will ask him: in whose language, business outcomes or audited accounting classifications?
Sarge